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Accession of the EU to the ECHR: Who Would Be Responsible in
Strasbourg?
by Dr Tobias Lock, Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, University College London
(www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/lock)
Contact: t.lock@ucl.ac.uk
I. Introduction
An accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) has been a topic in legal circles for over thirty years.1 The
discussion first culminated in a request by the European Commission for an
advisory opinion by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).2 Yet in that opinion,
the ECJ ruled out an accession in the absence of an explicit competence for
the (then) European Community (EC)3. More than ten years after that opinion,
the Treaty of Lisbon finally created such an explicit competence. According to
the new Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union shall
accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. This means that there
is not only a right for the EU to accede but also a duty, provided of course, an
1 Cf. e.g. Heribert Golsong, Grundrechtsschutz im Rahmen der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 1978, 346; European Commission,
Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin of the European
Communities, Supplement 2/79.
2 ECJ, Opinion 2/94, ECR [1996] I-1759.
3 For sake of legibility, this contribution generally refers to the European Union and
European Union Law even where it strictly speaking discusses the law of the EC or the EEC.
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accession is possible under the ECHR. Article 6 TEU has long referred to the
ECHR as a source of inspiration for the Union’s fundamental rights existing as
general principles of Union law and a long list of decisions by the ECJ is proof
of the importance the Convention has for the EU’s fundamental rights regime.4
The entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which in Article
52 (3) refers to the ECHR as the minimum standard for the protection of
human rights in the EU, consolidates the position of the ECHR in the EU and
is a manifestation of the growing importance of human rights in Union’s legal
order.5 Therefore, an accession to the ECHR constitutes the next logical step
in this development. It sends a clear signal that the EU is ready for an
external judicial review of its own regime of fundamental rights protection.
This will not only enhance the credibility of the EU’s human rights policy but
also foster the coherence of human rights protection in Europe.6
The accession will be achieved with the conclusion of an accession
treaty between the forty-seven parties to the Convention and the EU. The
procedure, which the EU must follow, is set out in Article 218 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Article 218 (8) provides that the Council
must act unanimously when concluding the accession treaty after having
obtained the consent of the European Parliament according to Article 218 (6)
TFEU. In addition, the treaty must be approved by the Member States in
accordance with their respective constitutional provisions. The question is, of
4 Starting with Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491; a detailed analysis of
this case law can be found in Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd. edn.,
OUP, Oxford 2006, 341 et seq.
5 On the protection of fundamental rights in the EU so far, cf. Paul Craig, Gráinne de
Búrca, EU Law, 4th edn., OUP, Oxford 2007, 379 et seq.
6 European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the
accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
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course, whether in light of the duty to accede, the Member States are allowed
to veto an accession. Considering that the Treaty is also binding on the
Member States, they, too, are under a duty to ensure that an accession will
take place. However, Article 6 (2) TEU does not specify the exact modalities
of such an accession. For instance, it does not prescribe whether the EU
accedes to the Convention only or also to some or all of its additional
protocols. Other modalities, such as the question of an EU judge at the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the exact relationship between
the two European courts, have also not been determined by the Lisbon Treaty.
Therefore there may be some, albeit limited, room for a veto by a Member
State’s representative in the Council. It is also to be expected that one or
more Member States will ask the ECJ for an opinion under Article 218 (11)
TFEU on whether the accession treaty is compatible with the EU’s treaties.
Changes not only took place in EU law. The European Convention
needed to be adapted, too, in order to make an accession of the EU legally
possible since originally the ECHR was only open to states. After Protocol
No. 14 to the ECHR has entered into force on 1 June 2010, this obstacle to an
accession has now been removed.7 Further amendments to the Convention
may, however, become necessary upon accession. It can be expected that
the accession treaty will include the necessary modifications.8
Preparations for an accession are already under way. The Stockholm
programme of the Council of the EU urges that “the rapid accession of the EU
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2009/2241 (INI)), A7-0144/2010, at para. 1; European
Commission, MEMO/10/84, 17 March 2010.
7 The new Article 59 (2) ECHR reads: ‘The European Union may accede to this
Convention’.
8 Cf. explanatory report to Protocol 14 (CETS No. 194).
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to the European Convention on Human Rights is of key importance”. 9
Moreover, the European Parliament has adopted a resolution on the
institutional aspects of an accession10. Negotiations started in early July
2010, only a month after an accession became legally possible.11 The aim is
that they are completed by June 2011.12 Already in 2002 the Council of
Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) issued a
memorandum on the technical and legal issues of an accession13 and has
since kept an eye on the issue.14
This contribution is less concerned with the formalities of an accession
but rather with a very practical question once an accession has taken place:
who should be held responsible in Strasbourg in the event of an alleged
violation of the ECHR brought about by EU law? I will first briefly discuss the
present situation regarding the responsibility of the EU and its Member States
for violations of the ECHR. I will then go on to discuss who should be held
responsible for actions and omissions resulting in a violation of the
Convention: the EU or the Member States.
II. Responsibility for violations of the ECHR: the Present Situation
9 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure
Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 2 December 2009, doc. 17024/09.
10 European Parliament resolution of 19 May 2010 on the institutional aspects of the
accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2009/2241 (INI)), A7-0144/2010.
11 Council of Europe, press release 545(2010), 7 July 2010, the Council had issued the
Commission with a mandate for negotiation on 4 June 2010 with negotiation directives
(Document 9689/10), which are classified.
12 CDDH(2010)010, para 25.
13 CDDH, Technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European
Convention on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2.
14 E.g. CDDH-BU(2009)002, at p. 16; the CDDH is actively involved in the discussions
on accession, cf. for instance CDDH-BU(2010)002.
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As the EU is presently not a party to the ECHR, it cannot be held directly
responsible for violations of the Convention caused by EU primary or
secondary law or other EU activities (executive or judicial). Any complaint
directed against the EU is inadmissible ratione personae.15 However, the
European Court of Human Rights holds the EU’s Member States responsible
for human rights violations originating in EU law. In the Matthews case the
ECtHR held a Member State of the European Union responsible for a breach
of the Convention brought about by EU primary law. The violation was rooted
in the EC Act on Direct Elections of 1976, a treaty concluded by all the EU
member states at the time. The Court in Matthews expressly stated:
The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations
provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured”. Member States’ responsibility
therefore continues even after such a transfer.16
This case law was modified in the Bosphorus case. In contrast to
Matthews, the violation in Bosphorus could not be found directly in EU primary
law, i.e. the treaties, but in secondary law, i.e. an act adopted by the
institutions of the EU.17 Bosphorus was concerned with the impounding of an
aircraft by Ireland on the basis of on an obligation in an EC regulation, which
itself was based on a Resolution by the United Nations (UN) Security
Council.18 Because the aircraft was impounded by Irish authorities on Irish
territory, the ECtHR had no difficulty finding that the applicant company was
15 Cf. European Commission of Human Rights, CFTD v European Communities,
alternatively: their Member States (App no 8030/77), 10 July 1978, para 3.
16 Matthews v United Kingdom (App no 24833/94), 18 February 1999, para 32.
17 Matthews, para. 157.
18 Bosphorus v Ireland (App no 45036/98), 30 June 2005.
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within Ireland’s jurisdiction according to Article 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). As a consequence Ireland could generally be held
responsible for impounding the aircraft and any violation of the ECHR that
arose therefrom. The ECtHR then famously held that the Contracting Parties
to the ECHR are not prohibited from transferring sovereign power to an
international organisation but that they remain responsible for all acts and
omissions of their organs ‘regardless whether the act or omission was a
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international
legal obligations’. 19 The Court went on to state that as long as the
international organisation ‘is considered to protect fundamental rights [...] in a
manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the
Convention provides’ the Court will presume that a State has acted in
compliance with the Convention, where the state had no discretion in
implementing the legal obligations flowing from its membership of the
organisation. 20 That presumption can, however, be rebutted where the
protection in the particular case is regarded as ‘manifestly deficient’.21 The
Court thus introduced a two stage test: at the first stage the Court examines
whether an organisation provides an equivalent protection, which will lead to
the presumption to apply. At the second stage the Court examines whether
that presumption has been rebutted in the concrete case before it because of
a manifest deficit in the protection of human rights. In the Bosphorus case,
the ECtHR considered the human rights protection afforded by the European
Union to be equivalent to that of the Convention, so that the presumption
19 Bosphorus, para. 153.
20 Bosphorus, paras. 155 and 156.
21 Bosphorus, para. 156.
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applied. The Court saw no reason why the protection in that case could be
considered manifestly deficient. 22 Therefore, the ECtHR held that the
interference with the applicant’s property rights protected by Article 1 of
Protocol 1 ECHR was justified.
The more recent case of Connolly introduced an important distinction.23
Connolly dealt with a labour dispute between an employee of the European
Commission and the European Communities. The applicant took his
complaint to the Court of First Instance and to the European Court of Justice
where his request to submit written observations to the opinion of the
Advocate General was denied. He then took a case against all the (then)
member states to Strasbourg claiming a violation of Article 6 ECHR. The
Court of Human Rights, however, made it clear that the Member States can
only be held responsible where there was a domestic act of some sort,24
which means that in cases where only the EU acted, such action would be
immune from Strasbourg’s scrutiny. The reason for this is that EU action
could not be attributed to the Member States and did thus not fall into their
jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.25
22 Bosphorus, paras. 159-166; on other cases, in which the presumption was applied,
cf. Tobias Lock, Beyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights’ Case Law on the
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 10 Human Rights Law Review (2010), 529.
23 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union (App no 73274/01) (Section V),
9 December 2008, confirmed in: Beygo v 46 Member States of the Council of Europe (App no
36099/06) (Section V), 16 June 2009, and Rambus Inc. v Germany (App no 40382/04)
(Section V), 16 June 2009.
24 It is clear from Kokkelvisserij that a request for a preliminary reference by a national
court qualifies as a domestic act, cf. Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands (App no 13645/05) (Section
III), 20 January 2009.
25 In Connolly, the ECtHR followed its rulings in Boivin v 34 Member States of the
Council of Europe (App no 73250/01) 9 September 2008 and Behrami and Behrami v France
(App no 71412/01) and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (App no 78166/01), 2 May
2007.
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III. After an Accession: Who would be responsible in Strasbourg?
An accession to the ECHR would close the gap in the human rights
protection against EU actions and omissions, which became evident in
Connolly. The EU would in such a case be directly subjected to the control
mechanisms established by the Convention. Individual applications directed
against the EU would thus no longer be inadmissible.
Cases such as Connolly will not cause many problems in the future.
The problematic questions with which this contribution is mainly concerned
are (1) what will happen in situations like in Bosphorus where a Member State
has acted but where that action was rooted in an obligation resulting from EU
law; (2) whether the Member States should remain responsible under the
Convention in cases like Matthews where the violation of the ECHR can be
found in primary EU law and (3) how omissions should be dealt with.
1. Member State Action
Most cases involving EU law will reach the ECtHR via the individual
complaints procedure provided for in Article 34 ECHR. Under that procedure,
it is for the complainant to designate the respondent.26 Normally the question
of the correct respondent can be answered very easily: It is the party, whose
authorities have acted. But once the EU has acceded to the ECHR the
question arises how the responsibility between the Member States and the
EU should be split. The EU only rarely acts vis-à-vis the individual. It is
usually the Member States which execute obligations arising from EU law.
This can for instance mean that an authority of a Member State executes
26 Article 47 of the ECtHR’s Rules of Court.
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directly applicable EU law, such as the Treaties or regulations. Another
example would be that the Member States’ legislature implements an EU
directive, which is then executed by the Member States’ authorities. To
complicate things further, in many cases which come before the ECtHR, e.g.
those involving criminal or family law, the respondent Member State will have
acted in the absence of any EU legal obligations but out of its own sovereign
right. The question is therefore, in which cases, if any, the EU should be held
responsible and in which cases the Member State. Or should there be a joint
or a joint and several liability?
Where a Member State violates the Convention, an applicant will in the
future have to make a decision whom to hold responsible before the ECtHR:
the EU or the Member State. The problem has been foreseen by the drafters
of the Lisbon Treaty. Art 1 (b) of the Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty on
accession to the ECHR provides:
The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the
‘European Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union shall
make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law, in
particular with regard to: […] the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-
Member States and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or
the Union as appropriate.27
The question of course is, who the ‘appropriate’ addressee is. Various
proposals have recently been made during hearings held in the European
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685785
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Parliament but also by the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human
Rights. Some of these proposals involve changes to the present procedure,
such as the introduction of a co-respondent model or other mechanisms. I
shall first discuss solutions which would not necessitate further amendments
to the ECHR.
a. Solutions on the basis of the present ECHR
The starting point for this discussion is Art. 1 ECHR, which reads:
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.
Based on Article 1 ECHR, the obvious solution would be to examine in each
case whether the action fell into the jurisdiction of the Member State or into
the jurisdiction of the European Union.
aa. The EU’s division of competences
Therefore, one possibility would be to attribute responsibility according to the
EU’s internal division of competences. Where the EU had the competence to
legislate, the EU would be the correct respondent; where the Member States
had that competence, they would be responsible. This would at first glance
have the advantage of holding that party responsible which is truly to blame
for the violation and which could also remove it.
27 Protocol (No. 8) relating to Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the
accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685785
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(1) The ECHR as a mixed agreement?
The attribution of responsibility according to the internal division of
competences is indeed one of the solutions discussed for the attribution of
responsibility in case of a violation of a mixed agreement. Mixed agreements
are usually concluded because neither the EU nor the Member States have
the competence to conclude the agreement alone.28 There are no clear rules
governing the responsibility for violations of such agreements under
international treaty law or customary international law.29 The case law of the
international courts or the ECJ is not fully conclusive either. In the absence of
a declaration of competence by the EU and its Member States, there is some
case law that indicates a joint and several responsibility of the EU and its
Member States.30 However, in other cases, at least some WTO panels seem
to have accepted a sole responsibility of the EU in matters, which fell into its
competence.31
I would argue that with regard to the ECHR, a solution in accordance
with the internal distribution of competences is not appropriate. It is arguable
that after an accession by the EU the ECHR can be called a mixed agreement
as both the Member States and the EU will be parties to it. However, the
ECHR will be an unusual type of mixed agreement. Atypically, the reason
why both the EU and the Member States will have become parties to the
Fundamental Freedoms [2010] OJ 83/273.
28 Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, Hart 2006, 137; Eeckhout, External
Relations of the European Union, OUP 2004, 191; a famous example were the WTO
agreements, cf. ECJ, Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I-5267.
29 Cf. the discussions in the International Law Commission on the responsibility of
international organisations, ILC A/64/10, 2009, Chapter 4.
30 E.g. ECJ, Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, para 35; Pieter Jan Kuijper, International
Responsibility for EU Mixed Agreements, in: Christophe Hillion/Panos Koutrakos (eds.),
Mixed Agreements Revisited, Hart 2010, 208; arguments for a joint and several responsibility
can be found in: Eva Steinberger, The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the
EC’s and the EC Member States’ Membership of the WTO, 17 EJIL (2006), 837.
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685785
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ECHR is not the lack of competence of either to accede to the ECHR alone
but the desire to ensure a complete protection of human rights. There is no
reason to doubt that they are externally fully responsible for violations of the
ECHR. It would therefore not make sense to base the question of
responsibility on the internal division of competences.
In addition, under this solution the advantage of holding the party
responsible which is truly to blame for the violation mentioned above is not
existent in all cases. This contention would only be true if the violation could
be found in the EU’s legislation itself and where the Member State had no
discretion in the implementation of that legislation. Where the Member State
enjoyed some discretion in the implementation of EU law, the violation was
not necessarily caused by EU law. The Member State may well have
exercised its discretion in a way, which violated the Convention. In such a
case, it would be appropriate to hold the Member State responsible alongside
the EU.
(2) The autonomy of European Union law
Moreover, there would be the additional problem that the Court of Justice of
the European Union regards EU law to be autonomous. The ECJ initially
employed the concept of autonomy to establish the primacy of EU law over
the national laws of the Member States. In Costa v ENEL it made its famous
statement that ‘the law stemming from the treaty [is] and independent source
of law’ (‘une source autonome’ in the original French).32 In Opinion 1/91, the
ECJ referred to the concept of autonomy for the first time with regard to the
31 Cf. Kuijper, 213 et seq.
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relationship between EU law and international law.33 In that Opinion, the
Court used the autonomy of the European Union’s legal order to strike down
the first draft agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). The ECJ
made three arguments based on that autonomy: the first argument related to
the ECJ’s exclusive jurisdiction to allocate responsibility between the EU and
the Member States; the second was concerned with the exclusivity of the
ECJ’s jurisdiction to interpret the EU Treaties; the third and final argument
addressed the limits which the autonomy of EU law sets to the transfer of new
powers on the EU’s institutions outside the amendment procedure found in
Article 48 TEU (then Article 236 EEC Treaty).
The agreement provided for the establishment of an EEA Court, which
would have had jurisdiction to interpret the agreement in disputes between the
‘contracting parties’. The contracting parties were the member states of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the EU (the then EEC) and its
Member States. In a dispute involving the EU or one of its Member States,
the term ‘contracting party’ could either mean the EU, a Member State or both
together, depending on the distribution of competences within the EU. The
ECJ held that the autonomy of EU law stood in the way of such a provision
since the allocation of responsibility between the EU and its Member States,
which had to be made on the basis of the EU Treaties, fell into the ECJ’s
exclusive jurisdiction under Articles 19 (1) TEU (ex Article 220 TEC) and 344
TFEU (ex Article 292 TEC). Thus this part of the agreement was incompatible
with the autonomy of EU law.34
32 ECJ, Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585 (Costa v ENEL).
33 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
34 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 34-35.
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Furthermore, the ECJ considered it to be incompatible with its own
exclusive jurisdiction that the EEA Court would be given jurisdiction to
interpret provisions of the EEA agreement, which were identical to provisions
found in EU law concerning trade and economic relations.35 The EEA Court
itself would not have been bound by the ECJ’s interpretation of these identical
provisions. Considering that the EU, and thus the ECJ, would have been
bound by a decision of the EEA Court interpreting these provisions, there
would have been a risk of undermining the autonomy of EU law.36
The last argument was concerned with the right granted to the national
courts of the EFTA member states concluding the agreement to ask the ECJ
for a preliminary ruling on these identical provisions. The ECJ held that the
autonomy of EU law was affected because the agreement did not provide that
the ruling of the ECJ had to be binding on the domestic court. While the ECJ
was willing to accept that an agreement could confer new powers on the EU’s
institutions, it considered that the powers conferred on the ECJ by the draft
agreement would essentially change the function of the court. Such changes
to the institutions of the EU could, however, only be made by way of a Treaty
amendment, according to the rules found in Article 48 TEU.37 Based on this
aspect of autonomy, the ECJ in Kadi found that an agreement must not
prejudice the constitutional principles of the Treaty, including the respect for
35 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 41.
36 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 39; in Opinion 1/92, which concerned a
revised version of the draft agreement on the EEA, the ECJ highlighted the importance of a
provision, which spelt out that the ECJ was not to be bound by the case law of the dispute
settlement body provided for in the agreement, as an ‘essential safeguard which is
indispensable for the autonomy of the [EU] legal order’, Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-2825, para
24.
37 ECJ, Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 58-61; confirmed in Opinion 1/00 [2002]
ECR I-3493, para 22.
Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685785
15
fundamental rights.38 It follows that the autonomy of EU law preserves the
EU’s internal hierarchy of norms with primary law at the top, trumping
agreements concluded by the EU and secondary law.39
An accession treaty concluded by the EU would have to respect the
autonomy of EU law as formulated by the ECJ. It is submitted that this is
how Protocol No. 8 to the Lisbon Treaty must be understood when it states
that the ‘specific characteristics of the Union and Union law’ must be
preserved.40 It can in particular be expected that a solution that would allow
the Strasbourg Court to allocate responsibility according to the EU’s internal
division of competences, would not be considered compatible with the
Treaties.41 Therefore a solution, according to which the correct respondent
would be determined on the basis of the internal distribution of competences
between the Member States and the EU is not workable.
Before this background, a proposal for an operative provision in the
accession treaty made in preparation of a working meeting between the
38 ECJ, Joined Cases 402/05 P and 415/05 P [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 282-285 (Kadi
and al Barakaat v Council).
39 Cf. ECJ, Case C-122/95, [1998] ECR I-973; Bruno de Witte, European Union Law:
How Autonomous is its Legal Order?, 65 Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht (2010), 141, 153.
40 Protocol (No. 8) relating to Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the
accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms [2010] OJ C 83/273.
41 This was again highlighted in European Parliament’s resolution of 19 May 2010 on
the institutional aspects of an accession to the ECHR (P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184) and by
Jean-Paul Jacqué made at a hearing before the European Parliament’s Committee on
Constitutional Affairs, 18 March 2010
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/hearingsCom.do?language=EN&body=A
FCO); the same problem would arise if the proposal by Jonas Christofferson (Danish Human
Rights Institute) at the same hearing were followed. He argued that where the line of division
between the EU’s and the Member State’s responsibility is not clear, it would be for the
ECtHR to decide.
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Commission and a CDDH working group may prove problematic. 42 The
proposal states:
The obligations of the European Union under the Convention and its protocols shall only
relate to acts and measures […]to the extent that the European Union would have had
competence to perform an act or measure, a failure to do so.
This proposal is clearly designed to avoid that the EU would be held
responsible for actions or omissions, which are not internally attributable to it.
However, it might prove counter-productive as the ECtHR would be required
to interpret the scope of the Union’s accession to the ECHR, which would
necessitate an interpretation of the allocation of competences under the EU
Treaties. The ECJ would probably consider the ECtHR’s jurisdiction in this
respect to constitute an unlawful intrusion of the autonomy of EU law.
bb. Declaration of Competence
One suggestion made by European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign
Affairs that individuals and non-Member States should be informed of the
division of responsibility by means of a declaration of competence.43 Such a
declaration would circumvent the issue of the ECtHR interpreting the EU’s
treaties and delineating the division of competence within the EU since the
ECtHR’s finding would be based on the declaration as a separate legal
42 Draft elements prepared by the Secretariat on General Issues and on Technical
adaptations to provisions of the ECHR and other instruments with respect to the EU as a
contracting party, CDDH-UE(2010)07.
43 Draft Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Committee on Constitutional
Affairs on institutional aspects of the accession of the European Union to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 9 February 2010,
(2009/2241(INI); confirmed by the European Parliament, resolution of 19 May 2010 on the
institutional aspects of an accession to the ECHR (P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184).
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instrument and not on the Treaties. However, as has just been outlined, a
division of responsibility along the lines of the internal competence to legislate
is not an appropriate solution for the ECHR.
In addition, there would be a practical issue. Declarations of
competence tend to be rather vague. For instance the declaration of
competence regarding the Convention on access to information, public
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental
matters states:
The European Community is responsible for the performance of those obligations resulting
from the Convention which are covered by Community law in force. The exercise of
Community competence is, by its nature, subject to continuous development.44
Such a declaration would clearly not be of much help to an individual
applicant: They would have to find out whether the obligation in question is
covered by EU law, which can be a complicated endeavour, especially
considering that individual applicants before the ECtHR do not need a legal
representative. Even more elaborate declarations would not necessarily be
easier to understand. In addition, such declarations usually include the
caveat that the division of competence between the Member States and the
EU is “subject to continuous development”. 45 This would mean that an
applicant, and later the ECtHR, would have to research the latest
developments in EU law in order to make an informed decision. This would
again endanger the autonomy of EU law as outlined above.
44 Council Decision of 17 February 2005, [2005] OJ L 124/1.
45 E.g. in the EU’s declaration of competence under Annex IX of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, [1998] OJ L 179/129.
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cc. Joint Liability
A joint liability of the EU and the Member State could provide a solution. It
would have the advantage that both the EU and the Member State would be
bound by a decision finding that there was a violation and they would thus
both be under an obligation to remove it. In addition, there would be no need
for the ECtHR to interpret EU law and rule on the division of competences
between Member States and the Union. However, a joint responsibility has
one considerable disadvantage: in cases which are unrelated to EU law (e.g.
a case alleging torture during an interrogation by the police) an applicant
would have to hold both the EU and the Member State to account. In such
cases the EU has a vested interest in not being a party to such a dispute.
Any conviction of a party by the ECtHR carries with it a condemnation of that
party’s legal system, which failed to remove the violation itself. It would be
hard for the EU to accept that it could alone be held responsible for violations
caused by its Member States in areas which have no relationship to EU law at
all. Thus such a solution, albeit legally possible, would hardly be politically
acceptable for the EU. Hence there are good arguments against the
introduction of a joint liability.
dd. Joint and Several Liability
An alternative would be the introduction of a joint and several liability. This
would mean that an applicant could either hold the Member State responsible,
or the EU, or both at the same time regardless of who actually caused the
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alleged violation. The EU and the Member States would have to come to an
internal attribution of liability.
From the applicant’s point of view, this solution would be effective. The
chosen respondent would be fully responsible. However, there are downsides
to the adoption of this type of liability as well. Again, there will be cases which
have no connection to EU law whatsoever. Any solution politically acceptable
to the EU would have to make sure that such cases are not directed against
the EU. But this would mean that there would have to be some tangible
criterion which would enable an applicant to decide whether to direct the
complaint against both the EU and the Member State or only the Member
State. No such criterion exists. Thus there would be the same problem as
with a joint liability if a joint and several responsibility were adopted.
ee. A solution based on the needs of the applicant
In my eyes, the solution to the question should bear in mind the situation of an
individual applicant. Applications can be made without the instruction of
counsel.46 It must therefore be ensured that an applicant who has no legal
training is capable of filing an admissible application. Therefore, the
designation of the correct respondent should not place a huge burden on the
applicant.
Thus the proposed solution would be to allow the claimant to hold that
party responsible which has acted in the concrete case. Where the EU’s
institutions have acted, the application must be directed against the EU.
Where a Member State has implemented obligations flowing from EU law,
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that Member State can be held responsible even if the actual violation is
rooted in EU law.
This solution has a number of advantages over the solutions discussed
above. It reduces the burden on the applicant in identifying the correct
respondent. Whenever a Member State has acted vis-à-vis the applicant, the
applicant can hold that Member State responsible under the ECHR,
independent of whether the Member State acted implementing EU law or not.
Of course, if this solution were adopted, a Member State would not be allowed
to defend its actions by referring to its duty to follow obligations flowing from
EU law. Furthermore, the applicant would have no difficulty in identifying the
appropriate domestic remedy and they could thus easily comply with the
requirements of Art. 35 ECHR. This would also underline the subsidiarity of
the external control exercised by the ECtHR. There are usually several
instances at national level. In addition, domestic courts have the right, and in
case of a court of last resort, the duty to make a request for a preliminary
reference to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. The ECJ would thus have the
opportunity to remedy the violation should that violation be rooted in EU law.
This would mean that the ECtHR would normally only decide where both the
courts of the Member States and the ECJ did not find a violation. This
solution would thus help to minimise the convictions of the EU and its Member
States.
This solution would also preserve the autonomy of EU law as outlined
above because the Strasbourg Court would not be called upon to delineate
the EU’s and the Member States competences. It would also rule out cases
46 Joachim Abr. Frowein/Wolfgang Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention,
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of EU responsibility for violations of the ECHR by a Member State acting
without any connection to its obligations under Union law.
Most importantly, the solution would avoid hampering the effective
protection of human rights: an applicant would not have to run the risk of
addressing their application against the wrong respondent because the
applicant misconstrued the division of competences between the EU and its
Member States. It would have the further advantage that actions of the
Member States would not have to be categorised into those where the
Member State acted out of its own sovereignty (e.g. where the applicant was
convicted for theft) and where the Member State’s action was prompted by
EU law (e.g. where the applicant’s airplane was impounded in accordance
with an EU regulation).
A similar proposal has been made by the European Parliament’s
Committee on Constitutional Affairs:
[…] any application by a citizen of the Union concerning an act or failure to act by an
institution or body of the Union should be directed solely against the latter and that similarly
any application concerning a measure by means of which a Member State implements the
law of the Union should be directed solely against the Member State, without prejudice to the
principle that, where the way in which responsibility for the act concerned is shared between
the Union and the Member State is not clearly defined, an application may be brought
simultaneously against the Union and the Member State.47
3rd edn., N.P. Engel Verlag 2009, Art. 34, para 66.
47 Draft Report on the institutional aspects of accession of the European Union to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2
February 2010 (2009/2241 (INI)), at para 7; this report was adopted by the European
Parliament on 19 May 2010, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0184.
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What is surprising, however, is the final clause where it is provided that an
applicant may bring an application against both the Union and the Member
State concerned where responsibility of the act is shared between the Union
and the Member State. It is not clear, which cases should be covered by this
proviso. An individual applicant will usually only deal with either the
authorities of a Member State or with EU authorities. Given that such a clear-
cut approach has the advantages outlined above, there is no need to resort to
shared responsibility for the act concerned. This proposal could even prove
counter-productive and complicate proceedings further because it is not clear
which domestic remedies need to be exhausted under Article 35 ECHR,
which requires an applicant to exhaust all domestic remedies before they can
file their complaint. Should an applicant therefore exhaust those before the
Member State’s courts or those before the EU’s courts or both?
b. Solutions involving changes to the ECHR
As shown above, a workable solution to the difficulty of determining the
correct respondent in cases of Member State action involving EU law, can be
found on the basis of the ECHR as it stands. However, in the discussion on
the EU’s accession, proposals necessitating amendments to the ECHR or the
ECtHR’s Rules of Court have been made, which warrant some comments.
aa. Preliminary Reference to the ECJ
One proposal made in the past was that ‘there would have to be a machinery
enabling [the EU] and its Member States to determine the division of
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competence before the Convention authorities.’ 48 The Human Rights Court
would either ask the EU and the Member State affected to declare in each
and every case who is the correct respondent or there would be a judicial
mechanism by which the ECJ could be asked to delineate the respective
competences. A similar proposal was made by Judge Timmermans of the
ECJ, which would allow the Commission to request an opinion from the ECJ
while the Strasbourg Court would suspend proceedings until the ECJ has
decided.49 These proposals are clearly based on the assumption that the
correct respondent is the party which had the competence to act under EU
law. They would have the advantage of preserving the autonomy of EU law
since every delineation of these competences would be made by an institution
of the EU.
However, apart from being time-consuming, this proposal would lead to
one difficulty: Under Art 35 ECHR the applicant of an individual complaint has
to exhaust all domestic remedies before they can file the complaint. In the
case of the EU, this would either be remedies before the Union courts (e.g.
according to Art. 263 TFEU), or before the courts of the Member State
depending on who is the respondent in Strasbourg. However, under this
48 The proposal was made by Belgium in her submissions to the ECJ’s Opinion 2/94,
[1996] ECR I-1759, para. I-6 (Accession of the European Communities to the ECHR); it
appears to be modelled on Art 6 (2) of Annex IX to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3, according to which every state party has right
to request from an international organisation and its Member States for information as to who
has responsibility; a similarly phrased proposal was more recently made by the ECJ,
Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the
accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, para 9, available at:
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en_2010-05-
21_12-10-16_272.pdf.
49 Christiaan Timmermans, L’adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la Convention
européenne des Droits de l’homme, at a hearing before the European Parliament’s
Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 18 March 2010
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/hearingsCom.do?language=EN&body=A
FCO.
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proposal, the true respondent would only be known after the application has
been made. Thus it does not seem to be workable in practice.
bb. The Co-Respondent Model
In addition to its proposal quoted above, the Committee on
Constitutional Affairs also recommends that in any case brought against a
Member State, the EU may join that Member State as a co-respondent with
leave of the Court, and vice versa.50 This idea seems to have first been
devised in a report on the technical and legal issues of a possible EU
accession to the ECHR by the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee for
Human Rights (CDDH).51 In cases directed against a Member State, which at
least potentially involve EU law, this proposal would allow for the EU to be
designated as a co-respondent.52
Under the current ECHR, there is only the possibility for a party to the
Convention whose national is an applicant in proceedings against another
party, to submit written comments and take part in the hearings. This so-
called third party intervention is laid down in Article 36 ECHR:53 In cases
brought by an EU national against a Member State, the EU would have the
right to intervene since according to Article 20 (1) TFEU every person holding
the nationality of a Member State also has EU citizenship. 54 The EU’s
50 ibid at para 8.
51 CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2 (28 June 2002), para 57 et seq; the CDDH refers to
the ‘co-defendant’; this author prefers the name ‘co-respondent’.
52 There is no real need to apply this model to cases where the EU was designated as
the respondent as under my proposal this would only ever be the case where the EU acted.
53 The third party intervention is the solution preferred by the French Senator Robert
Badinter, French Senate, Communication de M. Robert Badinter sur le mandat de négotiation
(E 5248´), 25 May 2010, available at: http://www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.html#toc1.
54 It has, however, been suggested not to regard EU citizens as ‘nationals’ of the EU in
that sense, cf. Summary of Discussions, Informal meeting of member states’ representatives
in the CDDH (4 May 2010), CDDH-BU (2010)002, Appendix VII, p. 35.
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comments in cases brought against a Member State which acted in pursuit of
its EU law obligations, may prove to be particularly helpful to the Court. The
third party intervention, however, has considerable weaknesses compared
with the proposed co-respondent model. Firstly, there is no obligation to join
the proceedings as a third party while under the co-respondent model such an
obligation would exist. Secondly, the decision of the Court does not become
res judicata for the third party whereas under the co-respondent model that
would be the case. The co-respondent would thus be obliged to remove the
violation as is the defendant originally designated by the applicant. In addition,
the applicant would not be able to bring another complaint regarding the same
violation against the co-respondent alone. Thirdly, there is only a right to
intervene where the applicant is an EU national. Especially in asylum cases,
in which applications to the ECHR are likely to happen, such an intervention
would be dependent on an invitation by the President of the Court.55
In all cases involving EU law, the co-respondent model would clearly
enhance the effective protection of human rights. Under my proposal outlined
above, it may well happen that a Member State will be held responsible for
violations of the ECHR which are actually rooted in EU law. Situations like the
Bosphorus case provide a good example. 56 In that case Ireland as the
respondent strictly followed its obligations flowing from EU law and had no
discretion. Had the ECtHR found a violation in that case, Ireland would have
faced this problem: It would have been obliged to release the aircraft under
the ECHR but at the same time would have still been under the obligation to
impound the aircraft under the EC regulation. As soon as the released aircraft
55 Cf. Article 36 (2) ECHR.
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would have landed in another Member State, that Member State would have
been obliged under EU law to impound it again. Therefore, Ireland would not
alone have been able to remedy the situation as the only lasting remedy
would have been a revocation or alteration of the regulation. Would such a
case come to Strasbourg after an accession and would the EU be made a co-
respondent, the EU itself would be bound to remedy the violation. This
example shows that the co-respondent model would be a worthwhile addition
to the ECHR.
I do not share the fear voiced by the French Senator Robert Badinter
that the introduction of the co-respondent model would be problematic since
every conviction of the EU would be equivalent to the conviction of all Member
States since the EU was a Union of states.57 This argument appears to
overlook that the EU has its own legal personality and as a supranational
organisation is not only a Union of states. Furthermore, I do not see why a
conviction of the EU as a Union of states, should have a different quality to
the conviction of a single member state. I would argue, to the contrary, that
the present situation where a Member State can be convicted in lieu of the
Union (and other Member States) is problematic. In extreme cases a Member
State can even be convicted for violations caused by EU law, which, because
of the prevailing qualified voting in the Council of the EU, may have entered
into force against the express will of that state.
Having established that the co-respondent model would be a welcome
solution for the attribution of responsibility, the question remains of who
should decide about making the EU a co-respondent? The CDDH correctly
56 Bosphorus v Ireland (App no 45036/98), 30 June 2005.
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noted that such a finding by the ECtHR might be regarded as a pre-
judgment.58 This leaves us with two possible solutions: either the respondent
Member State may decide or the EU itself.
In my view, the decision should generally lie with the respondent
Member State. Where that state believes that the alleged violation is, at least
partly, attributable to the EU, it should have the right to ask the EU to join the
proceedings as a respondent. Of course, this possibility is prone to abuse.
However, under the duty of loyalty in EU law laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU,
the Member State will arguably be banned from doing so in cases which have
no connection to EU law whatever. Further, the designation of the EU as a
co-respondent would in such a case have to be considered as an abuse of
process. Thus the ECtHR would have the right to deny the Member State’s
request in exceptional cases.
Whether the EU should also have a right to join in the absence of a
request by the respondent Member State, would need to be decided as well.
In view of Article 36 ECHR, which provides for a third party intervention, one
could come to the conclusion that this would not be necessary as the EU
could make its opinion known through this mechanism. Yet Article 36 (1)
ECHR only gives the EU a right to join proceedings where one of its citizens is
a claimant. In all other cases, the EU’s intervention would depend on a
discretionary decision by the President of the Court. While there is a relatively
liberal practice in this respect59, there is no reason for not granting the EU the
right to join as a co-respondent. Thus I would argue that both, the EU and the
57 Badinter, n 53.
58 CDDH at para 59.
59 On that liberal practice cf. David Harris/Michael O’Boyle/Ed Bates/Carla Buckley
(eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn., OUP, Oxford 2009, 855.
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Member State should be allowed to designate the EU as a co-respondent in a
case before the ECtHR.
2. Responsibility for violations found in primary EU law
Another open question is whether the EU should also be responsible for
violations of the ECHR caused by primary EU law, i.e. the Treaties and other
documents, which have the same legal status. The French government’s
suggestion that primary law should be excluded from the acts reviewable by
Strasbourg, is in my eyes not beneficial.60 Translated into the national context
it would remove the constitution of a party to the Convention from the
ECtHR’s control. There is no reason why that would be desirable.
Constitutions are generally not open to judicial review, even by constitutional
courts. Therefore, the lack of a previous decision by the ECJ cannot be a
good reason to exclude primary law. Furthermore, it will often be hard to
distinguish where exactly the violation lies, primary or secondary law. An
exact delineation would have to be carried out by the ECtHR, which could
endanger the autonomy of EU law since it is the ECJ’s monopoly to interpret
European Union law. Thus an exclusion of primary law from the jurisdiction of
the ECtHR could prove counterproductive.
The difference to cases involving secondary EU law is that violations
can only be remedied through a Treaty amendment following the procedure
set out in Article 48 TEU. Normally such an amendment requires the consent
of and ratification by all Member States. This means that the EU institutions
cannot remove the violation by themselves. They are dependent on the
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Member States. This has already been acknowledged in the Matthews case,
where the EU Act on Direct Elections was held to violate the right to free
elections of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and the United
Kingdom as a Member State of the EU was held responsible for that violation.
Since the EU itself cannot amend the Treaties, one could argue that it should
not be held responsible.61 On the other hand, parties to the Convention are
generally responsible for their own constitutions. Yet the difference lies in the
fact that these constitutions can be amended by internal procedures and are
not dependent on the conclusion of an amending treaty between states. But if
we currently accept that the Member States are responsible for EU action,
which they merely implemented and where they had no discretion, there is no
reason why in turn the EU should not be held responsible for its own primary
law. In addition, from the perspective of an applicant, it may be difficult to
ascertain whether a violation was rooted in EU primary law or in secondary
law (which was made on the basis of primary law) or whether the violation
was caused by the Member State while implementing EU Law. For the
question of the correct respondent, we should therefore apply the solution
found above: where a Member State acted, that Member State is the correct
respondent; where the EU acted, it is the EU. This should be independent of
whether the alleged violation is found in primary or secondary law.
60 That such an exclusion was mooted by the government of France is alluded to by
Badinter, n 53.
61 It has thus been argued that therefore only the Member States are responsible, cf.
Matthias Köngeter, Völkerrechtliche und innerstaatliche Probleme eines Beitritts der
Europäischen Union zur EMRK, in: Jürgen Bast (ed.), Die Europäische Verfassung,
Verfassungen in Europa, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2005, 230, 245.
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3. Omissions
So far, the discussion has focused on the responsibility for interferences with
human rights through actions. Should the same principles apply where the
applicant alleges an omission? The ECHR can also be violated where one of
the contracting parties omitted to take action when it had a positive obligation
to do so. Some of the rights guaranteed in the Convention explicitly contain
such obligations, for instance Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. Article 6 ECHR inter
alia obliges the state to provide a fair trial and Article 13 ECHR requires that
there be an effective remedy before a national authority. In the case of Artico
the Court found a violation of Article 6 (3) (c) ECHR because the Italian
authorities failed to act when the applicant’s lawyer who had been appointed
for legal aid purposes refused to take on the case.62 But even where the
ECHR does not explicitly oblige the state to act, a positive obligation can be
inherent in the right.63 For instance, in Airey v Ireland, the Court of Human
Rights found that the lack of legal aid in separation proceedings constituted a
breach of the right to respect for the private and family life guaranteed by
Article 8 ECHR because the Irish state had failed to make accessible a
judicial separation from the applicant’s husband.64
In the case of X and Y v The Netherlands, the Court found a violation
of Art. 8 ECHR because the rape of a mentally disabled person could not be
prosecuted as Dutch law required that the victim herself had to file a
complaint with the authorities where the victim was over the age of sixteen.
62 Artico v Italy, No. 6694/74, para 33.
63 Marckx v Belgium, No. 6833/74, para 31; Gaskin v UK, No. 10454/83, para 41; the
argument is that Article 1 ECHR obliges parties to ‘secure’ Convention rights.
64 Airey v Ireland, No. 6289/73, paras 31-33.
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The Court found that this gap in the legal protection could only be closed by
criminal law.65
The question is, of course, in how far alleged omissions by the
European Union might become the subject of a complaint. Considering that
the EU has only very limited executive competences, cases directed against
the EU will thus probably concern failures of the EU to legislate and
shortcomings of EU primary law.
a. Failures to legislate
Cases involving alleged failures to legislate might prove especially
problematic. While applications relating to family life, such as the one in Airey,
will hardly ever have an EU law aspect to them, one can identify one group of
cases, where the question of who is the correct respondent might become
relevant: the case law concerning the right to a healthy environment
protected as a sub-category of the right to respect for the home enshrined in
Article 8 ECHR. In the case of López Ostra the Court held that ‘severe
environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family
life adversely […].’66 The court left it open whether the violation in López
Ostra constituted an active interference by the state or an omission to comply
with a positive obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
secure the applicant’s rights.67 It is clear from the case, however, that a
positive duty to protect individuals from noise and emissions generally flows
65 X and Y v The Netherlands, No. 8978/80, paras 24-30.
66 López Ostra v Spain, No. 16798/90, para 51.
67 The question was also left open in Hatton v UK, No. 36022/97, para 119. In Taskin v
Turkey the Court found a violation, No. 46117/99, paras 111-126.
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from Art. 8 ECHR.68 Thus there is an obligation on the contracting parties to
offer such protection. The question against whom such cases of alleged
failures to provide protection should be addressed.
aa. Competences
The most effective way of dealing with this question would be direct such
applications against the entity which has the internal legislative competence.
In the area of environmental law, Art. 192 TFEU provides for a shared
competence between the EU and the Member States. This means that the
Member States may only exercise their competence to the extent that the EU
has not exercised its competence (Art. 2 (2) TFEU). Once the EU has
legislated, the Member States lose their competence to legislate in that field.
The Protocol on the exercise of shared competence clarifies that the exercise
of the competence ‘only covers those elements governed by the Union act in
question and therefore does not govern the whole area’.69 This would mean
that an applicant would have to direct their application against the EU where
the EU had already legislated in the area, or against the Member State where
the EU had not. This approach would clearly necessitate an appreciation of
the division of competences by the ECtHR, which would at first glance be
incompatible with the ECJ’s jurisdictional monopoly in this area.70
In the area of environmental law, however, an applicant would always
seek a greater protection through environmental norms. According to Art. 193
TFEU Member States may adopt more stringent protective measures. This
68 Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, N. P. Engel Verlag,
Kehlheim 2009, Art. 8, para. 44.
69 Protocol on the Exercise of Shared Competence, [2007] OJ C 306/158.
70 Cf. Opinion 1/91 ECR I-6079.
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would suggest that each Member State still has the competence to legislate
even where the EU has exercised its shared competence. Thus one might
conclude that an applicant can direct their application against their Member
State, which can legislate, or against the EU, which also has the right to
legislate. However, there are two problems with such a solution. First, in
order for the EU to have the right to legislate, the requirements of the principle
of subsidiarity laid down in Art. 5 (3) TEU must be satisfied. This would oblige
the ECtHR to check its requirements, which again would endanger the
autonomy of EU law, since it is only for the ECJ to adjudicate in this area.
Second, deviations from rules on environmental law according to Art. 193
TFEU would still have to be ‘compatible with the Treaties’. This implies that
they must not interfere with provisions of primary law, such as the free
movement of goods.71 Again, this question is for the ECJ to decide.
Equally, in an area where the EU has chosen to use Art. 114 TFEU as
the legal basis for harmonization, the question of the remaining competence
of the Member State (e.g. under Art. 114 (5) TFEU) would still have to be
determined by the ECJ.72
This means that a solution anchored to the division of competences is
not acceptable for the EU when it comes to individual complaints regarding
omissions.
71 Cf. ECJ C-203/96 [1998] ECR I-4075, para 35 et seq (Dusseldorp); C-389/96 [1998]
ECR I-4473, para 16 et seq (Ahler-Waggon GmbH).
72 On the correct legal basis in environmental law cf. Wolfgang Kahl, in: Calliess,
Christian/Ruffert, Matthias, EUV/EGV, C. H. Beck, Munich 2007, Art. 95, para 73 et seq.
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bb. Other Solutions
Thus the question is which solution should be adopted? In principle,
the same solutions as outlined above come to mind: there is the option of a
joint liability, a joint and several liability, or the co-respondent model. For the
reasons outlined above, a joint or a joint and several responsibility have
considerable flaws.
In finding a solution, the main consideration should again be given to
the effectiveness of human rights protection especially for individual
applicants. It can at times be very difficult to distinguish between a complaint
against an action and a complaint against an alleged failure to act. For
instance, one of the areas of EU law which might come under scrutiny by the
ECtHR is fines awarded by the Commission in competition law.73 One of the
critical issues will be the alleged failure of the ECJ and the General Court to
explore the facts in such cases.74 Whether the violation of Article 6 ECHR in
such a case constitutes an action or an omission is debatable.
It is therefore argued that in nominating the correct respondent a
similar approach to that for actions should be adopted. The crucial difference
to the situation outlined above is that an applicant making a choice about
whom to designate as the respondent does not have a previous action as a
link for their decision. Any declaration by the EU and the Member States
designating who is responsible in which cases would be flawed because of
their necessary vagueness and resulting insecurity for the applicant.75
73 Cf. Jürgen Schwarze, Rechtsstaatliche Defizite des europäischen
Kartellbußverfahrens, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (2009), 6.
74 Cf. Schwarze, 10.
75 Cf. supra on the vagueness of declarations of competence.
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Therefore, the solution would be to allow the applicant to freely decide
whom to hold responsible. Clearly this involves the danger of holding the
wrong party to account. Here the co-respondent model could prove of great
value. Should the respondent feel that they are wrongly being held to account,
they should be allowed to ask the other to join the proceedings as a co-
respondent. The applicant would not risk the application to be dismissed
ratione personae as both the Member State and the EU would initially have to
be deemed responsible. Where the ECtHR finds that there was a violation of
the Convention, the decision will be binding on both. Moreover, the Court will
not have to make any pronouncements on the division of competences
between the EU and the Member States, which would preserve the autonomy
of EU law. Where the Court finds a violation, the EU and the Member State
concerned will have to come to an internal agreement as to who is
responsible for remedying it.
The proposal has the further advantage of being simple in that the
same rules will apply for actions and omissions. This means that an individual
applicant would be not required to differentiate between an action and an
omission, which can at times be very difficult. This procedural simplicity will
again help to enhance the human rights protection for the individual.
b. Primary Law
With regard to shortcomings in EU primary law, we can mainly think of cases
involving violations of the judicial rights laid down in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.
One provision which might prove problematic in the future is Article 263 (4)
TFEU, which provides for access to the ECJ against acts addressed to a
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natural or legal person or acts which are of a direct and individual concern to
them as well as against regulatory acts where such acts affect them directly
and do not entail implementing measures. With the inclusion of regulatory
acts the Lisbon Treaty may have managed to close an existing gap in the right
to challenge such acts before the ECJ.76 However, it will be for the ECJ to
determine what constitutes such an act. Article 263 (4) TFEU might still prove
to be an insufficient legal remedy.77 Having established that there are no
convincing arguments not to hold the EU responsible for violations found in
primary law, an applicant will usually not have any difficulty in identifying the
correct respondent. Especially where the applicant wants to enforce their
judicial rights, it will usually be clear in which judicial system, European or
domestic, the violation can be found.
IV. Conclusion
This contribution has only dealt with one of the many facets of an accession
by the EU to the ECHR. It has attempted to show the strengths and
weaknesses of various solutions to the question of the correct respondent in
proceedings before the ECtHR. Whatever the solution will eventually look like,
it is crucial that it takes into account the position of an individual applicant who
has no counsel. Otherwise the effectiveness of human rights protection risks
76 This became evident in ECJ Case C-50/00 P [2002] ECR I-6677 (Unión de Pequeños
Agricultores v Council); cf. especially the criticism voiced in his opinion by AG Jacobs,
paras 102 et seq.
77 Cf. for a recent discussion of this issue S. Balthasar, Locus standi rules for
challenges to regulatory acts by private applicants: the new art. 263 (4) TFEU, European Law
Review 2010, 542, who argues that regulations constitute ‘regulatory acts’; a different stance
is taken by D. Chalmers/G. Davies/G. Monti, European Union Law, 2nd edn., CUP,
Cambridge 2010, 414-415.
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being undermined by far too technical requirements for access to the
Strasbourg Court.
This contribution was not able to discuss the ramifications of an
accession for the state complaint under Article 33 ECHR or the future of the
presumption in the Bosphorus decision.78 Further open questions concern the
position of an EU judge on the ECtHR and the participation of the EU in the
supervision of the execution of judgments in the Council of Ministers under
Article 46 (2) ECHR since the EU will not become a party to the Council of
Europe and thus will not automatically have a seat in the Council of Ministers.
Moreover, it will remain to be seen whether the first accession of an
international organization to a human rights treaty will set a new trend in
motion which will lead to more similar accession in the future. For the EU, the
next step might be an accession to the Council of Europe’s European Social
Charter.79
78 Cf. Tobias Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship Between the Two
European Courts, 8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2009), 375.
79 A proposal has been made by the European Parliament’s Committee on
Constitutional Affairs, Draft Report on the institutional aspects of the accession of the
European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (2009/2241(INI)), para 13.
